DRAM is the most prevalent memory technology used in laptops, mobile phones, workstations and servers. As such, its security is paramount, yet DRAM attacks remain as viable as ever despite many attempts to resolve its security problems. The toolkit of DRAM disturb attacks has expanded with the introduction of new techniques such as Half-Double and RowPress, and it is likely that additional form of disturbance errors (and reliability and security issues) will emerge as we scale DRAM devices to smaller feature sizes. DRAM is also plagued by additional forms of attack, including side-channel, Denial-of-Service (DoS), and cold-boot attacks.
Against this backdrop, the industry is introducing new DRAM security solutions that require independent scrutiny from the academia. Academia continues to propose novel fixes for Rowhammer, often without the benefit of insight into constraints faced by the industry.
Registration and workshop program
Keynote
TBDPanel
TBDWorkshop chairs
- Salman Qazi, Google
- Moinuddin Qureshi, Georgia Tech
Program committee
- Lucian Cojocar, Intel
- Pietro Frigo, Qualcomm
- Daniel Gruss, TU Graz
- Nam Sung Kim, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
- Yoongu Kim
- Kaveh Razavi, ETH Zürich
- Onur Mutlu, ETH Zürich
- Prashant Nair, The University of British Columbia
- Randall Rooney, Micron
- Stefan Saroiu, Microsoft
- Yuval Yarom, Ruhr University Bochum
- Kuljit Bains, NVIDIA
- Victor van der Veen, Qualcomm
- Daniel Genkin, Georgia Tech
Sponsors
